Taking a Joke too Far

Kamra is as close as we can get to medieval European court jesters or village fools. By punishing a jester for a joke, we put at risk our right to free speech, sense of humour and right to say what we think needs to be said

- Jayant Tripathi

HAVE Kunal Kamra’s tweets “scandalised” the Supreme Court or “lowered its authority”? The famous line, often misattributed to Voltaire—I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it—has been the aspirational benchmark for the votaries of the absolute right of freedom of speech and expression.

In India, the Constitution provides the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, but makes that right subject to certain “reasonable restrictions” in relation to, inter alia, contempt of court.

The history of the contempt jurisdiction of courts emanates, in the common law system, from the doctrine of “inherent powers” of the courts. The Contempt of Courts Act of 1921 and the subsequent Act of 1952 did not make any attempt to define what constituted “contempt of court”. It was left to the courts to decide on the basis of common law doctrine of “inherent powers” and judicial precedent, as to what constituted “contempt” and the extent of punishment.

The problem with such an unfettered “inherent” right to punish for acts perceived as contempt is best illustrated in the recent movie The Trial of the Chicago Seven—based on real events— where the defendants’ lawyer was sentenced to four years in prison for repeatedly referring to the judge as Mr Hoffman, instead of “Your Honour”.