An Unequal War

Repeated attacks on the forces by Maoists have shown that counter strategies haven’t worked. Without a proper security doctrine, clear leadership and good intelligence, this war will see more bloodshed

- Praful Bakshi

IT is a universal phenomenon for any state to be in a situation of armed conflict, be it external or internal. However, any international armed conflict, though more severe, is far easier to handle than the one within its own boundaries with its own people.

This type of conflict is called insurgency warfare. If this situation gets more serious, it could develop into what the Geneva Convention terms as a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC). This type of conflict is carried out by anti-government forces, which occupy a vast amount of national territory, have an independent governing mechanism and their own well-armed and disciplined fighting force, with a proper chain of command like the one created by the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

In an external conflict, the entire nation comes together as one body to face the threat. However, when it comes to an internal conflict like the Naxal problem, it becomes a protracted armed struggle between the central government and a number of politically motivated bodies with different ideologies, supported by the local population and sometimes with external armed and monetary support.

The Naxals, at one time, occupied over 40,000 sq km of territory in the Red Corridor, extending from the south of Nepal to the north of Andhra Pra desh, challenging the security forces very aggressively. The recent loss of 22 CRPF jawans in an ambush by Maoist insurgents in Bastar is one of the many examples of internal conflict. The entire problem, which is socio-economic, has taken firm root and would require a deep understanding of the situation if we want to eradicate it.