Escaping Scepticism with Hegel & Heidegger

Benedict O’Connell asks, must reasoning ultimately rest upon mere assumption?

- Benedict O’Connell

When we examine any particular belief or partic-ular line of reasoning, we need to compare it with some accepted standard to test whether or not it is sound. But herein lies a problem, for this accepted standard must itself be examined for its validity; and the standard used to examine that standard also examined, and so on, and so on. In attempting to justify a means of examination of ideas, evidently one is led to a potential infinite regress, since every examination apparently involves an accepted standard, but every accepted standard requires an examination of its own validity to justify its own use... Is there any foundation upon which we might properly examine our ideas?

This issue is already found in ancient sceptical thought, most notably in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (160-210 AD). It also illustrates a problem that GWF Hegel considers in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). As Hegel explains, whether the accepted standard for testing ideas be science or some other means of examination, if it is not itself examined, then a valid examination simply will not occur. In other words, if an examination of a standard does not occur, then one holds that particular standard by mere assumption.