The New Red Army

- Ananth Krishnan

Since Xi Jinping took over as the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and became president of the republic in November 2012 and March 2013 respectively, perhaps the most marked difference from his predecessor Hu Jintao has been his dealings with the military. Under the terms of his succession as head of the party and as president, Xi was also given his third post—chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)— putting him in the unique position of commanding the party, government and military all at once.

On February 1, Xi announced what the PLA Daily described as “the largest scale military reform since the 1950s”. The reforms will cement his direct control over every sphere of the vast military, which has, for decades, functioned as a state within a state, with untrammelled power and nil supervision. Besides its four main forces—the army, navy, air force and Second Artillery Corps that commands missiles and nuclear weapons—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was run by a vast bureaucracy spread over four general departments—the general staff, political, logistics and armament. Largely autonomous fiefdoms, favoured generals here promoted their own, lined their pockets and ruled over vast bureaucracies and commercial interests worth billions.

In January, Xi, in one swift stroke, disbanded the four departments and brought them under the direct control of the CMC. Cut to size, they have been placed on a par with 15 smaller, specialised functional ‘services’ departments, including one devoted to anti-corruption and “discipline inspection”. Xi described the move as “a dramatic breakthrough made in the reform of the military leadership and command system”. So, for the first time in the PLA’s history, the CMC will take control of its entire administration.