What China Wants
The Atlantic|May 2020
Chinese leaders’ combination of superiority and insecurity is growing more dangerous. The U.S. needs a new strategy to reflect that
By H. R. McMaster
What China Wants

I THE FORBIDDEN CITY

On November 8, 2017, Air Force One touched down in Beijing, marking the start of a state visit hosted by China’s president and Communist Party chairman, Xi Jinping. From my first day on the job as President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, China had been a top priority. The country figured prominently in what President Barack Obama had identified for his successor as the biggest immediate problem the new administration would face—what to do about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. But many other questions about the nature and future of the relationship between China and the United States had also emerged, reflecting China’s fundamentally different perception of the world.

Since the heady days of Deng Xiaoping, in the late 1970s, the assumptions that had governed the American approach to our relationship with China were these: After being welcomed into the international political and economic order, China would play by the rules, open its markets, and privatize its economy. As the country became more prosperous, the Chinese government would respect the rights of its people and liberalize politically. But those assumptions were proving to be wrong.

Diese Geschichte stammt aus der May 2020-Ausgabe von The Atlantic.

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Diese Geschichte stammt aus der May 2020-Ausgabe von The Atlantic.

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