How Johnson Almost Failed The Good Friday Agreement

His suggestion that the Irish border would not be a problem came close to causing irreparable damage, says Sean O'Grady

- Sean O'Grady

Interesting fact as we reach the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement: there is no actual reference to a "hard border" or "soft border", or anything like that, to be found in the famous text.

It is certainly a matter of hard political reality, though, that the GFA relies on there being no hard land-border between Ireland (ie the EU) and Northern Ireland (ie the UK). That is why we have a partial trade border down the Irish Sea between Great Britain and Northern Ireland instead.

The border had to go somewhere. If it was to be on the island of Ireland it would be unacceptable to nationalists and republicans, and most unionists.

But if it was plonked down the Irish Sea, then, as we see now, unionists will find it irksome, alienating and equally unacceptable. The origins of the present troubles, and the (thankfully still slight) risk of a return to the Troubles, lies in Brexit and its impact.

Reconciling Brexit with the Irish peace process is a frankly insoluble problem, like a Rubik's Cube that someone has secretly sabotaged. The best you can do is to get it mostly right, which is where Rishi Sunak's Windsor Framework is superior to Boris Johnson's original Northern Ireland protocol.

But the protocol, with all its flaws, was what Johnson signed without understanding it, so the legend goes. Hence his culpability. Sunak's Framework is flawed, but he's got a lot further than Johnson ever did. That's because he was bothered about Northern Ireland in a way Johnson never seemed to be.

So, if you want to rely on the GFA as a sort of latter-day holy writ to sustain some argument or other, then you will not find it in the original document. What you have instead is the adamant and (mostly) sincere commitment from virtually everyone involved that a hard border is simply unacceptable.