HIT AND RUN

The Balakot strike was a triumph of planning and execution, and it redefined strategic equations in the subcontinent

- AIR MARSHAL (RETD) C. HARIKUMAR

THE PUNITIVE AIR strike at Balakot changed the security narrative in the subcontinent. Having been a victim of the Pakistani deep state’s sponsored terrorism for too long, India raised the costs for Islamabad with the punitive air strike. A new normal also emerged. India’s political leadership realised that use of airpower need not be escalatory; that there exists a large window for sub-conventional or limited war options between two nuclear powers.

The action also exposed the existence of state-run terrorist camps in Pakistan. The proof of the pudding is that there has been no major terrorist attack since then.

The attack on a CRPF convoy at Pulwama on February 14 killed 40 jawans. By evening, Jaish-e-Mohammad’s involvement was confirmed. By the time the cabinet committee on security met the next morning, the Western Air Command (WAC), on the directions of the air chief, had briefed him on the options for punitive action.

Operation Parakram was ordered after the 2001 attack on Parliament, in which the militaries on both the sides were deployed for a full-fledged conventional war. A sub-conventional plan was formulated, post-Parakram, involving select squadrons. A few fighter squadrons and units were put on standby 24/7 for short-notice missions. After the Kaluchak massacre of May 2002, we prepared for air strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan. After the 26/11 Mumbai attack of 2008, we had a tacit clearance from the government for a punitive strike.