Tea with the Taliban?

With the US withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, India has been pushed out of its comfort zone. It may have to consider the once unthinkable policy of sitting down with the Taliban to stay relevant in Kabul and protect its interests in the region

- MANDIRA NAYAR

It took prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao less than an hour to relay a message back to the Indian ambassador in Kabul: to grant ousted Afghanistan president Dr Mohammad Najibullah asylum in India and fly him out of the war-torn country. It was not an easy decision. The mujahideen, destined to be the new rulers, would never forget and forgive. The situation was precarious. Civil war had broken out and there was intense regional rivalry. Najib’s family had been flown out to Delhi two weeks earlier. A plane waited on the tarmac for him. Benon Sevan, head of the United Nations humanitarian aid division to Afghanistan, was to accompany him to ensure his safety.

But on that fateful morning of April 17, 1992, Najib’s convoy could not clear the penultimate security barricade at Kabul airport. Abdul Rashid Dostam, the warlord who controlled the airport, had switched sides. But Rao refused to give Najib sanctuary in the Indian embassy, fearing a backlash against Indians in Afghanistan. Najib was forced to take refuge in the UN compound, where he stayed for four years until his gruesome execution by the Taliban.

The episode offers a glimpse of the complexity of India’s engagement with Afghanistan and the intricate interplay of history, emotions, hard-nosed diplomacy, strategic interests, capabilities and choices. It also serves as an example of India’s commitment and the extent of its involvement—a legacy that has continued since the days of prime minister Morarji Desai.