Metaphysical Skepticism

Jacob Bell argues that we can’t determine the ultimate nature of reality.

-  JACOB BELL

Metaphysics can be thought of as an investigation into the ultimate or fundamental nature of reality. In other words, it is the attempt to reveal and describe how and what things really are at some foundational level.The most popular kind of metaphysics seems focused on determining whether the world is best described as fundamentally physical, mental, neutral, or some combination of these. I have no quarrel with many of the questions that metaphysics seeks to investigate. Here I am concerned with the metaphysical doctrines which make grand claims, such as ‘everything is physical’ or ‘everything is mental’. Popular examples of these doctrines include physicalism and idealism. Less mainstream positions which are gaining in popularity include neutral monism and panpsychism. I will settle for brief descriptions of the two more popular positions. Physicalism refers to the thesis that everything which exists is physical, including thoughts, numbers, minds, and consciousness (if these things exist, of course). Idealism, in contrast, is the thesis that everything which exists is in some sense mental or a product of consciousness, including seemingly non-mental physical objects such as rocks, chairs, and planets. I am neither a physicalist nor an idealist. This isn’t because I take some other metaphysical theory as true, but because I am extremely skeptical of any position that makes grand sweeping generalizations regarding the fundamental nature of reality. Let me tell you why.

The core beliefs of physicalism and idealism are both experientially and empirically inadequate. That is, neither my experience of the world nor empirical investigation into reality can determine which theory describes the ultimate nature of reality, because they are