Two-front deterrence

India needs clear deterrence against both likely adversaries. With China, it lies in raising costs of aggression to levels it should find unaffordable. For Pakistan, it has to be punitive

- SHEKHAR GUPTA

Two weeks back, we had raised questions about the decline in India's defence budget as a percentage of both gross domestic product (GDP) and the national budget. We had then promised a second part talking about how to raise the resources to increase it to 2.5 per cent of GDP, from 1.9 per cent, over the next four years, and where to invest these additional funds. Donald Trump's dramatic victory overtook events last week. That's why the second part comes now.

We can start this story from the fateful night of December 9, 1971, at the peak of fighting in that war. It was fateful because this was the night INS Khukri was sunk by the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor, becoming the only ship the Navy has lost to combat. Instead of hiding, the Hangor had made its presence evident, setting up a bait.

India took up the challenge and sent out a three-ship formation optimised for anti-submarine warfare to hunt for it. One ship, INS Kuthar, developed engine trouble and pulled back.

The fact remains that all three had inadequate sonars.

Neither the Khukri nor the Kirpan spotted the Hangor. Two torpedoes fired at the Kirpan missed. The Khukri took three hits and sank almost instantaneously. That's the reason for the high fatalities, with only 67 survivors. A tale of eternal regret, however, still hangs to this day.

Though the Navy was aware of Pakistan's formidable submarine force, not enough had been done to build anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Even in this task force optimised for ASW, the sonars were inadequate. India had had months to prepare for this war, yet when it began, an experimental sonar was being tested on INS Khukri, in partnership with the Tata Group.