Moral Certainty

Toni Vogel Carey connects the dots.

- Toni Vogel Carey

The quaint-sounding term ‘moral certainty’ dates back to c.1400. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “a degree of probability so great as to admit of no reasonable doubt.” In the seventeenth century it became an important term in the law; according to a commentator in 1677 it meant “such a certainty as may warrant the judge to proceed to the sentence of death against the indicted party.” By the eighteenth century ‘moral certainty’ had become interchangeable with ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ not only in the law, but also in philosophy and polite conversation – even in religion, where it was argued into the nineteenth century that the truth of Christianity could be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” (see p.31 of Barbara Shapiro’s paper referenced at the end).

Of course, if you’re not sure whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, it might not help much to ask whether it has been established to a moral certainty. Then again, it might, for the two phrases have somewhat different connotations. One goes to the idea of external, objective proof, the other to the subjective question whether one feels able in good conscience to convict and sentence a fellow human being. DNA evidence today is capable of satisfying both criteria; but of course this is a relatively recent development, and I’m getting way ahead of myself.