UP Gunning: CIWS Threats And Responses

Whether to meet state-based or asymmetric threats, close-in weapons system capabilities remain central to naval operations in the Asia-Pacific region.

-  Dr Lee Willett

Western navies operating around the world have for some time faced the risk of close-in air and surface threats in the form of low-flying aircraft and missiles and especially small attack craft. This has underlined the enduring importance of a close-in weapons system capability (CIWS).

The risk remains largely from two sources: state-based threats, especially in key strategic choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz; and risks posed by nonstate actors, for example as demonstrated by the attack on the US Navy’s (USN’s) Flight I Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG) USS Cole in Aden harbour, Yemen in October 2000.

The conflict in Yemen has also provided the latest example of the non-state element of the enduring risk, with Allah Ansar (Houthi) rebels demonstrating an intent and capability to conduct missile and small craft attacks on merchant and naval ships operating off Yemen’s west coast just north of the Bab El Mandeb strait that runs between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Due to the increasingly crowded nature of littoral waters, such as those in many key strategic areas of the Asia-Pacific region, inbound threat targets sometimes may only be detected at close range.

The continuing requirement to deal with this threat is demonstrated in new platforms entering into the orders of battle of fleets operating in the region.

Supporting fires

The USN’s three new DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class DDGs provide an interesting example of a new concept of operations (CONOPS) for dealing with the close-in threat.