Europe far from balance in its China ties

The last year has solidified China's status as one of the most salient foreign-policy challenges facing Europe.

But it has been a long time coming. In fact, China's emergence at the forefront of debate in Europe is the product of three political realizations that have occurred since 2020.

The first was the recognition, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, that Europe had become dependent on China for a wide range of goods.

After decades of single-mindedly pursuing comparative advantage by relocating industries, including polluting industries, beyond its borders, Europe had to face hard facts. Distance might not matter anymore, but geopolitics does.

And a product that is not strategic can quickly become so if a crisis erupts if production or trade is disrupted, or if a single producer gains monopoly power.

But the pandemic, with its shortages of ordinary-turned-critical goods like masks and chemical reagents, was just the beginning.

The stakes have since risen considerably because China has a virtual monopoly over the production and/or refining of raw materials essential to the clean-energy transition. There is no readymade solution to this challenge. Both vigilance and political prudence will be necessary.

The second political realization came after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Though China did not, strictly speaking, support Russia's actions and thus avoided exposure to the diplomatic and economic costs Russia has incurred, especially via sanctions-it also refused to push back against the Kremlin, in the hopes that the war would weaken the United States and Nato. Having adopted a zero-sum mindset, Chinese leaders assumed that any such weakening would automatically benefit China, just as anything that harms China benefits the West.