Legalese of China's BRI agreements

When Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song proclaimed that Pokhara International Airport was a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project during its inaugural and also at the function marking the first flight from China, Nepali officials were caught off-guard by the declaration.

- SEMANTA DAHAL

The embarrassment was evident when Foreign Minister NP Saud scrambled to refute the Chinese claim. Speaking in Parliament late last month, he said that China and Nepal were still discussing how BRI projects would be implemented, and that Nepal had not executed a single one. That certainly was not a convincing explanation against the assertiveness of the Chinese claim. Considering these conflicting perspectives, perhaps a deep scrutiny of the legal arrangement of the BRI and its practice will help to unravel the confusion.

Over the course of the 10-year period since the mega initiative was first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping, it has adopted several names, including Silk Road Economic Belt and One Belt One Road Initiative, before settling on the better known Belt and Road Initiative. By June 2023, according to the Chinese government’s BRI portal, the BRI had expanded to 152 countries and 32 international organisations under a centralised network of more than 200 cooperation documents. These 200 cooperation documents consist of joint statements, joint communiqués and project specific contracts with a majority of the arrangements being bilateral memorandums of understanding (MoUs). Nepal’s engagement in the BRI also falls under the category of MoU which was concluded in 2017.