Not our war...

...but India should be part of the peace. New Delhi’s stand on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been dictated by its self-interest, but it should be geared to counter the costs that it would incur

- NAVTEJ SARNA

TIGHTROPE WALKING IS an acquired skill demanding years of practice and India’s abilities in this regard, as it balances its strategic relationships with Russia and the United States, are being severely tested by the Ukraine conflict. As the conflict intensifies and is brought closer home with the unfortunate death of an Indian student and growing difficulties for thousands more, there is no certainty how long this tightrope may have to extend, or how our official stance may evolve.

To recapitulate, India has so far taken—in carefully-crafted statements at the UN Security Council— what appears to be a balanced and even-handed stand; our fortuitous presence at the horseshoe table as a non-permanent member results in both a greater prominence for and a closer examination of our position. While these statements have predictably called for diplomatic dialogue, de-escalation of violence and a settlement on the basis of the Minsk Agreements, they have been perceived to contain a nuanced tilt towards Russia. Expressed in diplomatic shorthand, this tilt lies in our refusal to name Russia as the aggressor, a repeated reference to “legitimate security interests” of all states and a reluctance to categorise the developments as anything beyond “violence and hostilities”. While these statements have grown sharper with the spiralling of the situation into a full-blown conflict, the tightrope has held in essence, culminating in India’s abstention on the crucial draft resolution tabled on February 26 that sought to deplore Russian aggression.