US efforts to erect 'silicon fence' against China run into resistance

America's chip allies - the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea - have varying degrees of concern over the approach taken, its costs and its long-term efficacy | Power Play is a weekly column that looks at various facets of US-China rivalry and its implications for Asia

- Charissa Yong

WASHINGTON - Mr Alan Estevez, the man in charge of the rules restricting America's chip exports to China, was a picture of confidence when he predicted in October that other countries would soon join Washington in its virtual blockade to contain China's chip development.

"I'm very bullish. I have zero confidence that we're not going to have a deal," Mr Estevez, who heads the Bureau of Industry and Security, said with a fist pump and a chuckle.

Mr Peter Wennink, the man in charge of Dutch chip equipment maker ASML, was much less happy about America's push to get the Netherlands in line with the newer, stricter controls.

"We have already given up enough," the chief executive said last week in an interview with Dutch newspaper NRC, pointing to how current restrictions on what ASML can sell to China had benefited its American competitors.

Since the US announced its sweeping rules on exports of chips, chipmaking tools, and chips made overseas with American equipment to China in October, it has been pushing the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea to likewise restrict their own exports to China.

Bloomberg reported last week that Japan and the Netherlands have agreed in principle to join the US in tightening controls, though nothing has been officially announced yet.

But the visible daylight between the US and its allies, and the way Washington went ahead with rolling out its export curbs alone instead of first bringing allies on board, has raised eyebrows and concerns.

First, it has raised questions about why Washington decided to roll out its curbs unilaterally instead of spending more time to get allies to join in, and whether that was the best course of action.

Second, America's pressure on its allies to get on board with its controls, despite their worries that the curbs might go against some of their own interests, appears to be an uncomfortably top-down dynamic.