A US-INDIA MILITARY PARTNERSHIP SANS QUAD

Arguing that India cannot depend on the QUAD framework to deal with a Chinese threat, AMIT GUPTA suggests that a realistic workable alliance with the United States based on a fruitful weapons partnership between the two countries and the provision of military basing is a much better option for New Delhi

- AMIT GUPTA

2020 was a watershed year for India. Covid-19 wrecked the economy and once again proved that the Indian government, pressed by public concerns, would prioritise social spending over defence expenditure. At the same time, the fisticuffs with Chinese soldiers in Galwan, which led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese casualties, brought the India-China conflict to the front and center of the country’s security calculations.

Since Galwan, Indian strategic thinkers have sought to thread the needle between the country’s social priorities and defence concerns by suggesting that the Quadrilateral Initiative (QUAD) is the panacea for India’s security dilemma. More realistically, a workable alliance with the United States based on a fruitful weapons partnership between the two countries and the provision of military basing is a better option for New Delhi.

The fallacy of the QUAD

For the past 15 years optimists in the Indo-Pacific region have extolled the virtues of the QUAD even though skeptics have pointed out that the proposed alliance/initiative is overhyped and cannot work to contain a rising China. After Galwan, Indian analysts started to claim that Australia and Japan could be valuable strategic partners in the quest to deter China but such analyses overstate the abilities of Canberra and Tokyo against the economic and military juggernaut that is China.