The ‘Mary’s Room’ thought experiment devised by Frank Jackson goes something like this. Mary is raised from birth in a black and white room, never seeing anything of any other colour. Coloured objects are all carefully excluded. She always wears white gloves and there are no mirrors. Mary is given a normal education as far as is possible in the circumstances. She has all the information available to her to understand a full scientific account of colour, and in fact she eventually becomes a brilliant scientist specialising in colour perception. The question is, does Mary learn something new about colour, over and above the physical and scientific knowledge she has amassed, once she’s finally let out of her room and sees an expanse of bright red flowers for the first time? The idea is, if she does learn something new, there must be something about colour experience above and beyond any scientific description of it. Well, I think it can be denied that she learns something new; but not in the way most materialist philosophers might think.
For most philosophers of mind, the Mary’s Room thought experiment (originally presented in ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 32, Issue 127, 1982) is viewed in terms of one crucial factor: the idea that what Mary is seeing inside her black and white room is not a species of real colour experience. I will contest this idea later.
Pre-linguistic experiences have come to be known as qualia by philosophers of mind (quale is the singular). They’re the kinds of immediate subjective experiences we have as a result, originally, of sensation: when feeling a twinge, seeing a red apple, or tasting a piece of chocolate. They’re the qualities we’re intimately connected with when we experience the world.
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Anselm (1033-1109)
Martin Jenkins recalls the being of the creator of the ontological argument.
Is Brillo Box an Illustration?
Thomas E. Wartenberg uses Warhol's work to illustrate his theory of illustration.
Why is Freedom So Important To Us?
John Shand explains why free will is basic to humanity.
The Funnel of Righteousness
Peter Worley tells us how to be right, righter, rightest.
We're as Smart as the Universe Gets
James Miles argues, among other things, that E.T. will be like Kim Kardashian, and that the real threat of advanced AI has been misunderstood.
Managing the Mind
Roger Haines contemplates how we consciously manage our minds.
lain McGilchrist's Naturalized Metaphysics
Rogério Severo looks at the brain to see the world anew.
Love & Metaphysics
Peter Graarup Westergaard explains why love is never just physical, with the aid of Donald Davidson's anomalous monism.
Mary Leaves Her Room
Nigel Hems asks, does Mary see colours differently outside her room?
From Birds To Brains
Jonathan Moens considers whether emergence can explain minds from brains.