Chabahar & The US-Iran Conundrum

It's not Washington or Tehran that wants an escalation, only Tel Aviv. New Delhi should not give in to threats and be bold enough to pursue its own interests

INDIAN discourses on Chabahar are in a tizzy over the perceived US threat of sanctions hanging like a Damocles' sword on our contract with Iran to run a terminal at the port and the promise to invest in downstream projects to the tune of $350 million. But when it comes to US-Iran, issues get complicated, and the paradox is that the US is far from being in a punishing mood in the Gulf nowadays.

It must be understood that the hostility between the US and Iran has been somewhat surreal all through, with neither side wanting to escalate.

The only country that is genuinely interested in escalation is Israel. That was the leitmotif of Israel's attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1. Washington was aghast that it was not in the loop and very angry that Israel precipitated the crisis when a working relationship with Iran was an imperative need.

What ensued becomes a case study in the US-Iranian conundrum. Incredibly enough, what happened between April 1 and April 14 (when Iran retaliated against Israel) was that Washington and Tehran worked together so that Iran's retaliation would be "limited" and the US would see it coming so that it could defend Israel.

Washington prevailed upon Tehran not to hit populated areas but restrict itself to one or two Israeli military targets. An informal "hotline" was set up via Oman so that the crisis wouldn't spin out of control.

All this, of course, put Israel in a quandary and its swagger in the bazaar of punching above its weight and taking on a formidable adversary like Iran stands exposed. Furthermore, when Israel subsequently "retaliated" against Iran on April 19, the US kept it on a tight leash. Israelis ended up hitting one Iranian radar near Isfahan and that was the end of the story.