Interpretation which impede a just social order

On May 5, the Supreme Court of India declared as unconstitutional a Maharashtra law which provided for reservation to the Maratha community in education and public employment in the State. Four judges of the five-judge Bench wrote separate opinions, from which three primary findings emanated.

- Suhrith Parthasarathy

First, the Court held that the Maratha community did not constitute a socially and educationally backward class. Second, the judges discovered that the law was in breach of a rule previously set by the Court disallowing reservations made in excess of 50 per cent of the total available positions. Third — and on this finding, two judges on the Bench dissented — the Court held that State governments had no independent power to declare a group as a backward class. The latter two findings run sharply athwart values of equality and federalism, which the Court has long regarded — in rhetoric if nothing else — as integral to India’s democracy.

Not from the Constitution

The idea that reservations ought to be restricted to 50 per cent does not stem from the Constitution. The text of Articles 16(4) and 15(4) which confer power on the government to make reservations contains no such limitation. Originally, however, these clauses were seen by the Supreme Court as exceptions to a broad rule of formal equality that was thought to be envisioned by the Constitution. To that end, the Court held that to allow reservation in excess of 50 per cent would lead to an exception overriding a rule.